Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 13

Issue 5

Article 3

2008

Fin Rah!...A Welcome Change: Why the Merger Was Necessary to
Preserve U.S. Market Integrity
Yesenia Cervantes

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Yesenia Cervantes, Fin Rah!...A Welcome Change: Why the Merger Was Necessary to Preserve U.S.
Market Integrity, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 829 (2008).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol13/iss5/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

“FIN RAH!” . . . A WELCOME CHANGE: WHY THE
MERGER WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE U.S.
MARKET INTEGRITY
Yesenia Cervantes*

* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., New York University, 2003. I
would like to thank my family, especially my wonderful husband, John, for his undying
love and support and our son, Jonathan, for being my greatest motivation and
inspiration. I would also like to thank Dan Giangiobbe for his creativity, Christine
Walsh for her invaluable editorial assistance, and the JCFL editorial team for all their
hard work. Mrs. Cervantes has been employed as a Manager in Morgan Stanley’s
Compliance Department since 2005. The opinions expressed herein are entirely of the
author and not her employer.

829

830

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

I. INTRODUCTION
In an age when news of a corporate merger seldom raises an
eyebrow, it should come as no surprise that regulatory organizations
would eventually follow suit. Corporate mergers are typically the result
of efforts to increase the financial worth of the resultant company, in
hopes of higher stock prices and, therefore, wealthier shareholders.
However, the recent consolidation between the regulatory arm 1 of the
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (“NASD”), the two self-regulatory organizations
(“SROs”) chiefly responsible for oversight of the U.S. securities
industry, is the by-product of a different type of sought reward:
efficiency. 2
For years, members of the industry criticized the duplicative efforts
made by these two agencies and the discrepancies resulting from
conflicting rules. 3 Under the former system, firms belonging to both
agencies were “subject to dual—but not always consistent—rulebooks,
examinations, investigations, sweeps and enforcement actions.” 4 In an
attempt to rid the regulatory oversight schema of such contradictory
rules, these two organizations “unveiled . . . a plan to merge some of

1. NYSE, Complaints & Inquiries, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/complaintsinq
uiries/1088808969148.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). Only certain areas of NYSE
Regulation were affected by the consolidation. “Specifically, NYSE Regulation
continues to be responsible for conducting market surveillance and enforcing rules and
laws that relate to trading activity occurring on NYSE and NYSE Arca, as well as
ensuring that companies listed on NYSE and NYSE Arca meet their financial and
corporate governance listing standards.” Id.
2. Consolidation of NASD and Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working
Towards Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007) (testimony of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO of
FINRA), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Sch
apiro/P019169 [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony].
3. William H. Donaldson & Harvey L. Pitt, Outdated and Inefficient, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 2007, at A7.
4. Id.
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their operations” in November 2006. 5 The final organization became
known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 6
As with any business deal affecting the overall economy, questions
were raised concerning the potential impact on the public. 7 The
overarching purpose of the merger was investor protection. 8 However,
with optimism waning in the wake of the subprime mortgage debacle
and the American economy dangling over the precipice of recession,
some consumer advocates have questioned whether now is the best time
to reduce the number of regulators looking out for their interests. 9 To
the contrary, such issues prove that now is precisely the time to
consolidate and streamline the regulatory system.
The consolidation not only serves to address the issues of
duplication and inefficiency within the regulatory structure, but also the
conflicts of interest that in recent years have resulted as both
organizations focused on profit generation instead of on their obligations
as supervisory organizations. 10 The NASD’s role as creator and former
owner of the NASDAQ and the NYSE’s transition to a for-profit entity
in 2006 caused some to question whether the two self-regulatory
organizations could continue to regulate member firms in an impartial
manner. 11 Their return to exclusive service as regulatory agencies,
especially in this time of economic turmoil, reinforces the true
regulatory mission of investor protection.
A. Sub-Prime Disaster
Recent headlines have drawn the world’s attention to the subprime
crisis that has infiltrated virtually every aspect of the financial sector.
5. Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, NASD, NYSE Agree to Merge Some
Oversight–Supporters Foresee Streamlining In Market Regulation as Foes Fear Less
Protection For Individuals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2006, at C1.
6. FINRA,
About
the
Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Authority,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/CorporateInformation/index.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2008) [hereinafter About FINRA].
7. Carol E. Curtis, Bumps Emerge on Road to Completion of SRO Merger, SEC.
INDUS. NEWS, June 11, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10863673 (Westlaw).
8. See Helen Kearney, Regulation: The Burden and the Backlash, ON WALL
STREET, Feb. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1930499 (Westlaw).
9. Id.
10. George R. Kramer & Alan E. Sorcher, The Conflicting Roles of the New York
Stock Exchange, J. OF INV. COMPLIANCE, Dec. 22, 2006, at 54.
11. Id.
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Although some sectors have been impacted more than others, the
securities industry has surely been shaken. 12 Over the past few years,
credit terms had become uncharacteristically flexible and home loans
easily available, allowing anyone, including those with poor credit
histories and with low incomes, to qualify for a home mortgage loan. 13
The easy access to credit appealed to individuals seeking the American
dream of home ownership. Sadly, the dream turned into a nightmare as
many, especially those with adjustable rate mortgages, found themselves
unable to afford their mortgage payments and, subsequently, in default
on their loans. 14 Since the interest rates on over 1.8 million subprime
mortgages are scheduled to increase in 2008 15 and 2009, the number of
foreclosures will almost certainly continue to rise, necessitating the
financial industry to address the consequences of its investment
participation in subprime mortgages.
The stock market fallout in 2000 16 led to the development of
innovative yet highly speculative financial products, such as credit
default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and other financial
vehicles backed by subprime mortgages. 17 These investment choices
precipitated the venomous effects of the subprime mess on the brokerage
industry. 18 A true domino effect, one by one the big Wall Street firms
stepped forward with their massive subprime-related losses. 19 After
releasing its 2007 third-quarter earnings, Citigroup announced that it
would write down over $5 billion in losses, deeply cutting into the
12. Mark Gongloff, Credit Woes Slam Stocks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2007,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119608282533903873.html.
13. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, INT’L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/18/business/
18subprime.php.
14. Noelle Knox, Record Foreclosures Hit Mortgage Lenders, USA TODAY, Mar.
13, 2007, available at http://wwww.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-0313-foreclosures_N.htm.
15. Number of Foreclosures Soared in 2007, MSNBC.com, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22893703.
16. Noelle Knox, Mortgage Crisis: Home Loans Are Harder to Get, USA TODAY,
Aug. 6, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/200708-05-mortgage-lenders_N.htm.
17. Time to Brace for Impact, INV. ADVISER, Dec. 17, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 25785654 (Westlaw).
18. Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 12,
2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/2
6/101232838/index.htm.
19. Id.
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company’s financials. 20 The amount of write-downs continued to rise,
resulting in thousands of employee layoffs. 21 Merrill was also dealt a
hard blow and is expected to write-down over $15 billion. 22 Others
soon followed, 23 and the full extent of the damage is still to be
determined.
The meltdown left many questioning why regulators did not
prevent, or even foresee, the crisis, and wondering who dropped the
ball. 24 Many blamed the regulators for failing to recognize the
foreseeable credit issues that would arise from this type of
securitization. 25 Some asked, “[Where was the NASD] when subprime
funds were being dreamed up and then packaged and sold?” 26 While it
is too late to undo the damage, the consolidation comes at a crucial point
in our economy’s history and can be a tool to analyze what went wrong
and prevent a future disaster.
B. The Solution
The consolidation between the NYSE and NASD happened at the
right time. Not even a year into its existence, FINRA already initiated a
sweep to investigate firms and their marketing to customers of financial
products tied to mortgages. 27 Because of its new structure, FINRA is
20. Charles Gasparino, Citigroup Plans New Round of ‘Massive’ Job Cuts,
CNBC.com, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/21974307/.
21. Id.
22. Julia Werdigier & Jenny Anderson, Giant Write-Down is Seen for Merrill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/11/business/11wall
.html.
23. David Reilly & Karen Richardson, For Financial Stocks, Is It Another False
Bottom?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2008, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/S
B120044238607892763.html.
24. Paul Krugman, Blindly into the Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/opinion/21krugman.html.
25. See, e.g., Jessica Dickler, Senator Faults Regulators in Subprime Mess,
CNNMoney.com, Mar. 27, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/26/real_estate/Dodd/in
dex.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008); Dan Taylor, As NASD/FINRA Fiddled, Credit
Aug.
13,
2007,
available
at
Markets
Burned,
INVESTMENTNEWS,
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070813/FREE/7081302
1/1006.
26. Taylor, supra note 25.
27. David Scheer & Jesse Westbrook, Broker Probed by FINRA on Mortgage
Security Sales, Person Says, Bloomberg.com, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apNYRLoCVcUk&refer=home.
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able to place more emphasis on this crisis and on investor protection. 28
With a two entity system, “multiple levels of regulation [made it]
difficult to navigate and expose[d] consumers to gaps in protections.” 29
A single non-profit regulatory structure allows for more centralized
oversight of these areas and is better able to safeguard investors. 30 The
NYSE and NASD previously acted as both market operators and
regulators, which gave rise to potential conflicts and concerns. 31 The
new regulatory organization is again directing its attention on
investors. 32 FINRA is closely scrutinizing any areas where greater
protection is required and taking further action regarding solicitation and
product suitability for seniors. 33 It also uses a risk-based approach to
identify and combat critical financial industry issues. 34 This is
particularly necessary for the organizations entrusted with supervision
over those engaged in the financial industry, since the markets are open
to all participants, from the novice and inexperienced to the most
sophisticated investor.
FINRA named investor protection as its primary goal and has
already developed several programs to further its commitment to this
objective. 35 Although investor protection was previously an objective of
both SROs, their preoccupation with other market activities, such as
merging with exchanges, steered their attention away from this
purpose. 36 With U.S. capital markets serving as one of the leading and
most powerful forces in the world, it is essential that investors have trust
28. See FINRA, Putting Investors First, http://www.finra.org/InvestorInformation/
InvestorProtection/PuttingInvestorsFirst/index.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
29. Kearney, supra note 8.
30. Doug Schulman, Vice Chairman, NASD, Remarks at the Securities Traders
Association (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Doug
lasShulman/P018435 (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
31. Consolidation of NASD and Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working
Towards Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities
Industry Association), available at http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/pdf/lack
ritz5-17-07.pdf [hereinafter Lackritz Testimony].
32. Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at SIFMA Annual Meeting (Nov. 9,
2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P037447
(last visited Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA].
33. Kearney, supra note 8.
34. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. See generally NYSE Euronext, Timeline, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/
timeline_2000_Today_index.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
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and confidence in the system. 37 This requires constant transformation
and adoption of innovative measures to keep up with the ever-changing
environment.
C. The Merger
Aside from gaining recognition as the first exceptional change to
the securities oversight structure in decades, this merger also drew great
attention because of the parties involved. Regulatory organizations such
as the former NASD are generally non-profit organizations and their
main function is to effectively regulate their respective fields, not to
generate income. 38 Therefore, merging of such organizations involved
different motivation than typical mergers between for-profit companies.
Whenever for-profit organizations seek to merge, management has a
tendency to “envision new markets, more product lines and healthier
balance sheets.” 39 The transaction’s main objective typically is to
increase the bottom line. 40 Profit is so important that parties in these
impending mergers might be subjected to undesirable tactics since
different people and entities might not share the same perspectives on
profit. 41
Non-profits generally have less financial-related motivations to
consolidate. 42 The most frequently cited benefits for merging non-profit
organizations include “increased effect and reach,” fewer redundancies
in a specific area, “greater efficienc[y],” “stronger organization,” and

37. See Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at the Exchequer Club (June 20,
2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P019306
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
38. Schulman, supra note 30.
39. Not-For-Profit Advisor, On the Verge of a Merge? What to Consider Before
Proceeding, http://www.plantemoran.com/Industries/PublicSector/NotForProfit/Resour
ces/Not+For+Profit+Advisor/2006+Winter/On+the+Verge+of+a+Merge+What+to+Co
nsider+Before+Proceeding.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Not-For-Profit
Advisor].
40. Cf. Judith R. Thoyer, A New Look At Post-Merger Governance: The Dow Jones
Acquisition, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PLI Order No. 13964 657, 661 (2008)
(discussing social issues involves in various transactions).
41. See Robert Guy Matthews, Rio Tinto’s Earnings Illustrate Why It’s in Play,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at A13. BHP Billiton submitted an unsolicited takeover
offer for its rival RIO Tinto and RIO has been calling for rejection of the bid because,
among other things, it undervalues the company.
42. Not-For-Profit Advisor, supra note 39.
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“the continued ability to fulfill one’s mission.” 43 While FINRA’s goal
could be said to achieve all of these benefits, its foremost objectives are
to protect investors and advance market integrity by increasing
efficiency. 44 Two separate regulators essentially performing the same
functions was inefficient. Other countries recognized the presence of
multiple regulators as a shortcoming within their regulatory systems and
are now consolidating, if they have not already successfully done so. 45
On May 20, 1997, the U.K.’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
principal Finance Minister of the British government, announced that it
would merge “banking supervision and investment services
regulation” 46 into what was then known as the Securities and Investment
Board (“SIB”). SIB officially changed its name to the Financial
Services Authority (“FSA”) in October 1997 47 and continues to serve as
a model of streamlined regulation. 48 This single organization is
responsible for overseeing the banking, brokerage, and insurance
industries 49 and employs principles-based regulation, which allows firms
to decide how best to achieve their desired outcomes, rather than a rulesbased regulation system like in the United States, 50 which instead
focuses on the means. 51 Other countries followed the trend in regulatory
consolidation, especially members of the European Union (“E.U.”). 52
The European Central Bank has cited two main motivations for
consolidating supervisory functions within the E.U. 53 “First, they
represent a response to the rapid developments in the financial sector,
43.
44.
45.

Id.
FINRA, Putting Investors First, supra note 28.
Federal Financial Services Regulatory Consolidation, Overview,
http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33036/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
46. History of the FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/History/index.sht
ml (last visited May 1, 2008).
47. Id.
48. Kearney, supra note 8.
49. FSA, FSA Sector Teams, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Teams/index.sht
ml (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
50. Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Luxembourg Fund Industry
Association: Principles v. Rules (June 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007
/spch061407rcc.htm.
51. John Tiner, CEO, FSA, Speech at APCIMS Annual Conference (Oct. 13,
2006), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1013_jt.sh
tml (last visited May 7, 2008).
52. European Central Bank, Developments in National Supervisory Structures,
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/supervisorystructureen.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
53. Id.
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also with a view to national peculiarities. Second, they aim at enhancing
the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision.” 54 Essentially, these
countries have adopted the view that less is more when it comes to
financial oversight. 55 While other countries and territories outside the
E.U., like Hong Kong, 56 Dubai, 57 and Japan, 58 have also made attempts
to consolidate their financial regulators, 59 the FSA’s structure is
frequently mentioned as the prototype to be emulated by regulatory
bodies considering a merger. 60 The FSA’s timely address of the
subprime issues and shoddy lending practices within the U.K. in July
2007 further demonstrated its effectiveness in regulating the financial
industry. 61 The U.K. was not impacted as severely as the U.S., with
subprime lending accounting for only 10% of all homes in the country. 62
For such reasons, the NYSE and NASD worked cooperatively with the
FSA during the consolidation process and FINRA continues to do so,
especially to obtain guidance in its implementation of principles-based
regulation. 63

54.
55.

Id.
See generally id. (discussing the developments in national supervisory
structures of E.U. countries).
56. See The Securities and Futures Commission Homepage, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/
html/EN/ (last visited May 1, 2008).
57. Dubai Financial Services Authority, http://www.dfsa.ae/dfsa/about+us/who_we
_are/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
58. See Financial Services Agency Organization, http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/ab
out01_menu.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (showing the consolidated structure of the
Japanese Financial Services Agency).
59. Steve Zwick, Rube Goldberg’s Regulatory Legacy, FUTURES CHI., Feb. 1,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 2248865 (Westlaw).
60. Jeremy Grant, US Looks to London for Regulatory Model, FIN. TIMES ASIA,
Dec. 14, 2007, at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 24641743 (Westlaw).
61. Jennifer Hughes & Jane Croft, FSA in Subprime Crackdown, FIN. TIMES
LONDON, July 5, 2007, at 17.
62. Patrick Collinson, Subprime Lender Becomes First British Victim of Credit
Crunch, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/20
07/sep/11/money.mortgages.
63. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
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II. PRE-CONSOLIDATION
The NYSE and the NASD have long been recognized as two of the
leading SROs in the United States. 64 Both were instrumental in ensuring
that the firms they regulate 65 comply with the multitude of securities
industry rules and regulations. 66 While the two served similar purposes
as regulators, each had a very distinct history and origin as an SRO. In
order to truly appreciate the magnitude of the recent consolidation, it is
essential to understand their background and establishment as regulatory
agencies.
A. The New York Stock Exchange
Before passage of the federal securities laws 67 and the founding of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the NYSE had long
served as one of the principal exchanges for trading in securities. 68 The
NYSE originated in 1792. 69 For over a century, the NYSE, as well as
the other existing exchanges at the time, remained an unregulated entity,
governed only by its floor members and plagued with market
manipulation. 70 Some cite the lack of regulation of the securities
industry as one of the reasons why the economic crisis, spurred
primarily by fraudulent activity, 71 culminated and crippled the American
64. Both were established as SROs after the Maloney Act was passed in 1968. 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1968).
65. About FINRA, supra note 6. There are over 5,000 brokerage firms being
regulated by these entities. Id.
66. In addition to complying with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, members of the securities industry must also comply with rules
created by the SROs. See generally Self-Regulatory Organizations: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of Robert
Glauber, Chairman, NASD), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Rob
ertR.Glauber/P016123 (Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Glauber Testimony].
67. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78a. Both were enacted during a time of economic turmoil following the
Stock Market Crash of 1929.
68. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 73 (3d ed.
2003).
69. See History of the NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484
.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
70. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 48.
71. See id.
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economy with the stock market crash in 1929. 72 This disaster caused a
national crisis as millions of people lost their life savings. 73 This called
for reform and close scrutiny of financial practices, since investors lost
confidence in the American economy. 74 In order to prevent another
such catastrophe and to restore trust in the markets, Congress began
probing into the potential causes of the crash. 75
From 1932 to 1934, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
conducted an “investigation of stock exchange practices, usually called
the Pecora Hearings, in recognition of the decisive role played by the
committee’s counsel, Ferdinand Pecora.” 76 The investigation revealed
an abundance of corruption and supervisory deficiencies. 77 One area of
focus concerned the NYSE’s listing procedures, specifically its approval
process and due diligence when registering a company’s stock. 78
Enforcement of its listing requirements became unmanageable and
virtually nonexistent with the increase in new stock applications
between 1926 and 1929, 79 leading to the listing of worthless securities. 80
Frank Altschul, chairman of the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List,
stated at the Pecora Hearings “that the NYSE ceased making any
independent investigation of an application for the listing of additional
stock by a firm whose stock was previously listed unless there appeared

72. In addition to lax or nonexistent regulation of the stock market, there was a
proliferation of mischief and unscrupulous activity in other areas of the financial sector.
Id. Accounting principles were lenient during this time since firms were free to employ
whatever accounting methods they wanted, resulting in companies overstating their
worth in their financial statements and misrepresenting themselves to the investing
public. Id.
73. DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION:
FREEDOM FROM FEAR, PART ONE 163 (9th ed. 1999).
74. ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA 1929-1941, at 48
(Three Rivers Press N.Y. 1993).
75. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 2.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Cf. id. at 2 (discussing the fact that the conclusions of the Pecora hearings were
intended “to diminish . . . faith in the nation’s financial institutions”).
78. See id. at 47.
79. Id. at 47 (stating that new stock applications rose from 300 to over 750 between
1926 and 1929).
80. Id. In 1929, the NYSE had allowed Krueger and Toll Company to list “a
thirty-year debenture, reserving the right to substitute new pledged securities for those
listed as collateral on the application.” Id. The company later “replaced the French
debentures serving as collateral with less valuable Yugoslavian debentures.” Id.
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patently suspicious matter in the listing application.” 81
Pecora
successfully identified an instance where the NYSE failed to investigate
even when there was such a suspect matter. 82
Specialist trading was also closely scrutinized. Specialists are
responsible for maintaining a fair and orderly market in a specific
security by “acting as brokers’ brokers who [execute] purchase or sell
orders when the market price reache[s] [a] stipulated price . . . .” 83
Allegations “were made repeatedly” throughout the hearings accusing
specialists of using “their pivotal position to orchestrate pool operations
or exploit[ing] their knowledge of the specialist books in trading for
their own accounts.” 84 The NYSE’s lack of oversight in these areas was
later used as leverage to gain approval for restructuring of the
organization’s board. 85 Conclusion of the hearings led to the creation of
the SEC in 1934 and manifold industry regulations in an attempt to
restore investor confidence in the U.S. markets. 86 Even with the newly
created SEC, the market came close to suffering another crash between
1937 and 1938. 87 Many condemned the government’s efforts and cited
them as the cause of the recession that ensued shortly after the passage
of the federal securities laws. 88
SEC Chairman, William O. Douglas, in advocating the Act,
attributed the economic downturn to the NYSE’s regulatory
deficiencies 89 and prevailing conflicts of interest. 90 Douglas feared
repercussions stemming from the brokerage firms’ outcries, such as
hindrance from future securities legislation and repeal of some of the
SEC’s powers. 91 Douglas called for complete revamping of the NYSE’s
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 74. Evidence was discovered between May 3 and July 24, 1933,
uncovering a scheme involving Russell Brown, a specialist on the NYSE, who also
happened to be chairman of the board of American Commercial Alcohol. He and
several other individuals organized a pool operation, driving up American
Commercial’s stock price from $20 to almost $90. Id. at 88.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 99.
87. See id. at 160-61.
88. See generally id.
89. Id. at 162. Prior to becoming the SEC Chairman, William O. Douglas had been
a Yale Law Professor who opposed the Securities Act. Id. at 71.
90. Id. at 162-63.
91. Id. at 162.
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board to include a salaried, independent (non-industry) chair 92 and to
focus on representing the interests of the public. The existing structure
consisted of “floor traders and specialists who dominated New York
Stock Exchange governance.” 93 Douglas believed that independence of
board management would help eliminate the conflicts that had
proliferated throughout the industry, 94 mainly involving member
trading. 95 Douglas suspected that members’ short sale trading had
precipitated the extreme decline in the markets in 1937. 96 On March 17,
1938, on the heels of former NYSE President Richard Whitney’s
expulsion from the industry for embezzlement, 97 revisions to the
Exchange’s constitution were adopted. 98 Douglas resigned from the
SEC in 1939 after President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected him to serve
as a Supreme Court Justice. 99
In 1970, Congress enacted the Securities Investors Protection Act
(“SIPA”), “creating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”) to administer a fund providing $50,000 of insurance protection
to each customer of virtually all broker-dealers registered with the
SEC.” 100 SIPA vested the SEC with the authority to: (1) compel SROs
to implement any particular alterations or modifications to its rules,
practices or procedures related to the regularity and scope of its
investigations and examinations of its member firms; (2) require that
SROs supply the SIPC and/or the SEC with any reports or records
concerning the financial state of specific SRO members; and (3) require
that an SRO inspect a member company’s financial state. 101 The
NYSE’s Board of Governors asked the then former NYSE chairman,
William McChesney Martin, Jr., “to prepare a comprehensive study of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 161.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 162 (focusing specifically on the declines between September 7 and
October 25, 1937).
97. Id. at 173. Richard Whitney was NYSE President from 1930-1935. Id.
98. Id. William McChesney Martin, Jr. was appointed President of the NYSE,
serving in that role until 1940. Id. at 235.
99. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935-1975, at
62-63 (1975).
100. SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 465.
101. Id.

842

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

the New York Stock Exchange’s constitution, rules, and procedures,”102
which later became known as the Martin Report. 103
The Martin Report recommended reorganization of the NYSE to
recognize “its public nature and the respective interests of the public, the
companies listed on the exchange, and the members of the securities
industry involved.” 104 As a result, the NYSE restructured its board such
that it was “balanced between securities firms and issuer, institutional
investor, and public representatives.” 105 Additionally, it created a
nominating committee completely independent of both NYSE members
and the NYSE board and gave the committee the responsibility of
selecting new candidates for the board. 106 The NYSE also “became a
non-profit, non-dividend paying corporation, owned by its members.” 107
In December 2003, the SEC approved the NYSE’s proposed rule
change to amend its constitution and again reorganize its governance. 108
The most significant change was a decrease in the number of board
representatives and complete independence from management of the
NYSE. 109 Up to this point, the NYSE’s board had been comprised of up
to 24 members. 110 The approved governance structure in 2003 reduced
it to “between 6 and 12 members.” 111
The next few years marked some extraordinary changes in NYSE
history. 112 The merger of the NYSE and Archipelago Holdings Inc.,
operator of an electronic communications network, officially ended the

102.
103.
104.

Id. at 469.
Id.
See Concerning Improving the Governance of the New York Stock Exchange:
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Nov. 20, 2003)
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/ts112003whd.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Amendment and
Restatement of the Constitution of the Exchange to Reform the Governance and
Management Architecture of the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48946, File
No. SR-NYSE-2003-34 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/sro/3448946.htm.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 68 (discussing the transformation of Wall
Street and the financial industry).
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NYSE sale of seats on December 30, 2005. 113 This was a significant
change to the NYSE’s membership structure. The result was the “NYSE
Group, Inc., a for-profit, publicly-owned company.” 114 Rather than
taking the initial public offering route and offering new shares, the
NYSE became a public company by virtue of its merger with
Archipelago. 115 The public could now own a piece of one of the major
U.S. securities exchanges. In 2007, the NYSE merged with Euronext,
the pan-European exchange running “stock exchanges in Paris,
Amsterdam, Brussels and Portugal, as well as a derivatives exchange in
London.” 116 This merger resulted in the “first trans-Atlantic stock
exchange[,]” 117 “offer[ing a] diverse array of financial products and
services.” 118 Already known as “the world’s largest and most liquid
cash equities exchange,” 119 the NYSE now gained an even greater
presence in the markets. It was at this juncture that the organization was
ready to engage in the most noteworthy merger in securities industry
history—consolidation with the NASD.
1. The National Association of Securities Dealers
In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, 120 amending the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 121 The Maloney Act “established
the concept of a registered national securities association or SRO,” 122

113.
114.
115.

NYSE Euronext Timeline, supra note 36.
Id.
Jerry Knight, Stock Markets on the Open Market: Exchanges Go Public,
Generate Windfalls, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2006, at D1.
116. Mark Stein, From Top of the Corporate World to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2006, at C2.
117. Id.
118. Press Release, NYSE, Shares of NYSE Euronext Begin Trading, Marking the
Beginning of the First Truly Global Financial Marketplace (Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.nyse.com/press/1175665133200.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). “NYSE
Euronext [brings] together six cash equities exchanges in five countries and six
derivatives exchanges [and now serves as] a world leader for listings, trading in cash
equities, equity and interest rate derivatives, bonds and the distribution of market data.”
Id.
119. Id.
120. See Maloney Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1938).
121. Joshua E. Levine, The New Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 16, 2007, at 4.
122. Id.
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which would “regulate the activities of their member broker-dealers.” 123
The SEC would keep watch over SROs, which included the NYSE, and
the SROs would now be required “to implement the federal securities
laws as well as their own rules.” 124
In addition to heightening SRO standards, the NASD was
established 125 to police over-the-counter (“OTC”) trading. Knowing
that it could not effectively oversee the area of OTC trading, the SEC
had granted the NASD extensive oversight and power, establishing it as
a quasi-governmental body and giving it disciplinary authority over
these firms. 126 Firms were enticed to join mainly due to the economic
incentives that came with being subject to such regulations. “Brokerdealers who were members of [the] NASD were charged a ‘wholesale’
price when they purchased or sold securities from other NASD
members; non-NASD members had to pay the same price as the
public.” 127
The agency’s tremendous growth called for new regulatory
practices. 128 In 1956, the NASD established qualification exams for
those wishing to engage in securities business, 129 a requirement aimed at
protecting investors and ensuring that its member representatives were
123. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 17371, 45
FR 83707 (LEXIS) n.44 (Dec. 19, 1980).
124. Annette L. Nazaretch, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Broker Dealer Regulation (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2007/spch011107aln.htm.
125. It is important to note that a predecessor existed prior to establishment of the
NASD, formed by the Code Committee under the National Recovery Act of 1933. See
History of the NASD, http://www.people.hbs.edu/aperold/resource/ISR/Teaching%20N
ote/AKS%20-%20History%20of%20the%20NASD.doc (last visited May 1, 2008). The
NRA was declared unconstitutional and
the question of whether the Investment Bankers Code Committee should be continued
on a voluntary basis was submitted to a vote of Code members. Ninety percent of
those who voted agreed to join and finance such an organization. The Code
Committee thus became the Investment bankers Conference Committee, its function
to be one of discussion and conference with federal agencies looking toward the
establishment of an organization to preserve and formalize the values of the code.
Within a year, a successor organization known as the Investment Bankers Conference,
Inc., was established to proceed more formally towards the objective of a legal entity
empowered to administer rules promoting ‘high standards of commercial honor.’

Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 189.
See SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 188.
History of the NASD, supra note 125.
Id.
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knowledgeable and fit to advise the public. Because the NASD saw a
surge in customers ill-served “by brokers who were often inept,” 130 the
After four years of
NASD made its exams more difficult. 131
consultation with the SEC, the NASD ordered the construction of “a
national electronic data-processing and communications system to
provide instantaneous over-the-counter price quotations from over-thecounter market-makers.” 132 The National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”) system went into effect in
1971. 133 Automation revolutionized the OTC market. 134 While serving
only as a quotation system at its inception, by the end of its first year in
existence, it had expanded to also gather and distribute volume data. 135
The NASD’s regulatory duties continued to rise from 1975 to 2001,
prompting the organization to return to its original roots as exclusively a
self-regulatory organization. To help accomplish this goal, in 2000 the
NASD decided to spin off NASDAQ. 136 From its inception in 1937, the
NASD grew to become one of the most influential and authoritative
regulatory bodies in the U.S. 137 The NASD’s decision to merge with the
NYSE in 2007 further cemented its prominence in the securities
industry.
III. PROBLEMS WITH DUAL REGULATION
While the concept of multiple regulators might in theory seem
ideal, in practice it created many unnecessary complexities. Complying
with two SROs’ rules led to some trying issues for the securities
industry. 138 The greatest challenges resulted from the conflicting rules
and high costs of compliance. 139 Responsible for independently
promulgating rules for their member firms, these agencies were under no
obligation to consult with each other when developing their rules,
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

SOBEL, supra note 99, at 248.
Id.
SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 353.
Id. at 490.
See id.
History of NASD, supra note 125.
Id.
Id.
See Stephen L. Carlson & Frank A. Fernandez, The Costs of Compliance in the
U.S. Securities Industry, 7 SIA RESEARCH REPORTS 1 (2006), available at
http://archives2.sifma.org/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol7-2.pdf.
139. Id.
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resulting in frequent overlap. 140 These difficulties were identified as the
principal reasons for the consolidation. 141 While only firms dually
regulated were affected, they comprised some of the largest firms in the
securities business. 142 Of the nearly 5,100 brokerage firms in the U.S.,
approximately 200 were subject to dual regulation 143 and consisted of
the largest securities firms in the country. 144 Therefore, the detrimental
effects were substantial enough to warrant change.
Perhaps the greatest impetus for the merger was the need to end
duplication. As successfully demonstrated by the FSA, a centralized
regulatory source is the optimal structure to address such issues. 145 As
provided by FINRA’s CEO, Mary Schapiro, 146 having two, separate
SROs resulted in “a duplicative, sometimes conflicting system that
[made] inefficient use of resources, and as such, [could be] detrimental
to the ultimate goal of investor protection.” 147 Independently, the NYSE
and the NASD oversaw more than 5,000 “securities firms doing
business with the public in the United States.” 148 Marc E. Lackritz,
President of SIFMA, testified before Congress in 2006 and voiced the
association’s concerns regarding multiple SROs, mainly citing

140.
141.

Id.
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to
Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the
Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 34-55495, File No. SR-NASD-2007-023 (Mar. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-55495.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Filing
Proposed Rule Change].
142. Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small,
WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at D2.
143. Glauber Testimony, supra note 66.
144. See Fortune 500 List of Largest Securities Firms, http://money.cnn.com/magazi
nes/fortune/fortune500/2007/performers/companies/profits/index.html (last visited Apr.
30, 2008).
145. See generally FINANCIAL SERVICE AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED
REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf (discussing principles based regulation
in the U.K.).
146. Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. NYSE Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K), ex. 99.2 (Nov. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.v1b2.b.htm#1stPage.
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duplication and disorganization. 149 This sentiment was consistently
echoed by members of the industry.
Those organizations subject to dual regulation “expend[ed]
significant time, resources and effort interpreting and applying different
standards to their businesses, including different recordkeeping,
procedural and audit trail requirements for the same product or
service.” 150 Broker-dealers belonging to both agencies were subject to
not only two separate, but also sometimes inconsistent, sets of rules.
Even where the agencies had identical rules on a particular issue, each
SRO in some instances interpreted the rules differently. 151 Many
securities firms often raised their dissatisfaction over such incongruity
within the regulatory system. 152 Moreover, these inconsistencies opened
the door for regulatory arbitrage, leading not only to inefficiency and
high costs for firms, but also creating the risk of firms taking advantage
of the system and providing a disservice to the investing public. 153 Such
issues led to the proposal and subsequent approval of the merger.
In addition to efficiency and consistency, the consolidation also
reduced the excessive costs associated with complying with two sets of
rules. Much criticism of the previous structure “center[ed] around the
cost of compliance . . . . According to one report by SIFMA, securities
firms spent $23.2 billion on compliance in 2004 and an estimated $25.5
billion in 2005.” 154 Some of these costs could be attributed to firms
having to build intricate surveillance systems, training staff and
developing efficient processes to ensure fulfillment of their regulatory

149. A Review of Self Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Market: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of
Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association), available at
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/archives/Lackritz3-9-06.html.
150. Supporting and Improving SRO Consolidation, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, June 11,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10863703 (Westlaw).
151. See Reinventing Self-Regulation, Sec. Indus. Assoc., White Paper, Jan. 5,
2000, updated Oct. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/pd
f_archives/reinventingselfreg.html.
152. Id.
153. Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at the Distinguished Speaker Series at Georgetown
University McDonough School of Business (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.finra.org/Press
Room/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/P037079 (last visited May 1, 2008).
154. Simon Butler, NASD Chief Mary L. Schapiro is Gearing Up for the Challenges
Posed by the Consolidation with NYSE Regulation, ON WALL ST., June 1, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 10205905 (Westlaw).
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obligations. 155 FINRA expects the consolidation to result in lower costs
and fees to these firms. 156 Financial relief is expected since there will be
one less SRO regulating the industry. This is certainly a welcome
benefit as financial firms continue to suffer economically from the
subprime crisis. 157
IV. THE CONSOLIDATION
While truly a significant occasion in the history of the securities
industry, the consolidation emerged out of several recent events. In a
1999 speech concerning market structure at Columbia University, then
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt spoke about the frustrations of dual
regulation. 158 He “raised concerns as to whether for-profit, shareholderowned exchanges qualitatively increased the conflicts of interest
inherent in this structure so as to warrant a separation of member
regulation from market regulation, with member regulation ideally put in
a single SRO for all members.” 159 This was subsequently referred to as
the “‘hybrid’ model of self-regulation.” 160 After this speech came a
SIFMA White Paper, which analyzed several alternate SRO models and
ultimately embraced the hybrid model. 161 These events laid the
groundwork for the consolidation.
In conformity with the requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, the NASD filed its proposed rule change with the SEC on
March 19, 2007. 162 The submitted notice outlined several key changes
to the NASD’s by-laws that would accommodate the merger, including
changes to its new governance structure. 163 On March 26, 2007, the
155.
156.
157.

See Carlson & Fernandez, supra note 138, at 6.
Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141.
Lingling Wei & Randall Smith, Wall Street Gears for Its New Pain, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 3, 2008, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1204505698954065
11.html.
158. Levine, supra note 121.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Levine, supra note 121. SIFMA White Papers explore a variety of securities
industry topics.
Recent issues can be found on SIFMA’s website at
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/white-papers.shtml.
162. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141; NASD Release
2007-023, http://www.finra.org/RulesRegulation/RuleFilings/2007RuleFilings/P018845
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
163. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141.
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proposed rule change was published and commentary solicited from the
public. 164 Over 70 comment letters from industry firms, consumer
advocates and investors voicing their opinions towards the merger and
assisting the SEC in its approval decision were received. 165
A. Comment Letters
1. Opposition
Smaller firms mainly voiced opposition to the consolidation
because they believed their interests were not being considered. 166 The
three main areas of concern were: the by-law changes, the one-time
payment to firms, and the arbitration forum.
The first area of concern was the by-law change. Most of the
comments received opposing adoption of the by-law changes suggested
that the new by-laws would not protect investors and would not give
small brokerage firms adequate representation. 167 Many of the smaller
firms already felt that the industry favored the larger companies and that
they were at a disadvantage, especially regarding the cost of compliance
with regulatory provisions. 168 In response to this concern, the NASD
provided that this new organization would better protect investors
because it would streamline securities firm regulation and take action
ensuring that individuals advising the public were well-trained and that
the products recommended were suitable for their clients. 169
FINRA also believes that the new governance structure affords
small brokerage firms greater input and representation. 170 One benefit is
that they will now have three seats on the FINRA board, instead of the
164. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to
Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the
Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg.
14149 (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/docum
ents/rule_filing/p018866.pdf.
165. See e.g., Comments on NASD Rulemaking, http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd2007-023/nasd2007023.shtml (last visited May 1, 2008).
166. See e.g., id. (noting the concerns, questions and comments different affected
groups had about the consolidation).
167. Id.
168. Letter from Bonnie K. Wachtel to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/commen
ts/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-56.pdf.
169. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
170. Butler, supra note 154.
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one seat they had on the NASD board. 171 Small firms will also be the
only ones allowed to select their representatives. 172 Additionally, “the
small firm advisory board will be 50% elected instead of solely
appointed by the NASD.” 173
This board will determine which
exemptions might be appropriate for these companies 174 and will serve
as the voice of the smaller firms, ensuring “that issues of particular
interest and concern to small firms are effectively communicated to and
considered by the FINRA Board of Governors.” 175
The second area of concern was the $35,000 payment. In
anticipation of the cost savings to firms as a result of the consolidation,
FINRA gave each member firm a one-time $35,000 payment. 176 Several
commentators felt that the amount was inadequate and that more could
have been offered. 177 In response, the NASD explained that as a taxexempt 501(c)(6) corporation, it is not permitted to pay out any form of
dividends because doing so would result in forfeiture of this status. 178
The NASD consulted with the Internal Revenue Service prior to
announcing the expected disbursement amount, 179 who granted approval
because the payment represented the projected cash flows for each firm
as a result of the consolidation. 180 More specifically, it did not
constitute a tax code violation because the payment is solely based upon
the cost efficiencies that the consolidation is expected to yield. 181
The third area of concern was the selection of arbitration for the
merged entity’s dispute resolution forum. The critics that cited the

171. Id. Having more seats on the board allows small firms greater input in
regulatory changes or proposals that may affect them.
172. Id.
173. Id. Previously, the advisory board from small firms was solely appointed by
the NASD. Id.
174. Donna Block, Regulatory Consolidation Raises Concerns, N.Y.L.J., May 24,
2007, at 5.
175. FINRA, FINRA Small Firm Advisory Board, http://www.finra.org/Resources/
InformationforSmallFirms/p010702 (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
176. NYSE Group Inc., supra note 149.
177. Comments on NASD Rulemaking, supra note 167.
178. See Response Letter from T. Grant Callery, NASD, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y,
SEC (July 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-85.pdf.
179. See Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change, supra note 141, n.6.
180. See Response Letter from Mario J. Verdolini, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell, to
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (July 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007023/nasd2007023-87.pdf.
181. Id.
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arbitration forum 182 as a point of conflict took issue with the
composition of the arbitration panels, the costs to customers and
dispositive motions. 183 Integration of the two forums is still in progress
and the comments concerning the panels and dispositive motions will be
taken into consideration. 184 One critic claimed that a share of the cost
savings from the consolidation should have been used to reduce
customer fees for use of the new arbitration forum. 185 In its response,
the NASD provided that the resulting lower costs for administration of
the forum impacted the firms, not the investors. 186 Firms are the ones
that bear the expenses associated with the forum because they are the
ones that have to pay for “staff salaries and benefits, arbitrator training
and travel, long-term leased space, computer systems, supplies, and
equipment.” 187 Users of the forum, on the other hand, are only
responsible for paying fees associated with administration of their own
personal claims. 188 Therefore, it is justified that the cost savings be
spread to the firms and not to individual investors.
2. Support
Many voiced the end of duplication, inefficiency and exorbitant
costs as the basis for their support for the merger, 189 regarding the
182. See Letter from Public Members of Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (Jan. 12, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-10.pdf; Letter from Les
Greenberg to SEC (Apr. 11, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007023/nasd2007023-19.pdf; Letter from Kathryn L. Lundgren to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-67.pdf; Letter from Steven B.
Caruso, President, Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association to SEC (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-65.pdf; Letter from William F.
Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Mass. Sec. Div., Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to SEC (Apr. 18, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007023/nasd2007023-73.pdf.
183. Response Letter from Linda D. Fienberg, President, Dispute Resolution,
NASD, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (May 29, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd2007-023/nasd2007023-81.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The following comment letters all support consolidation. See Letter from Joan
Hinchman, Nat’l Ass’n of Compliance Prof’ls, Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr.
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change as a positive move for the industry. One supporter felt that the
merger would allow “business owners and representatives [to] spend
more time focusing on their customers rather than [on] a myriad of
inconsistent rules from multiple regulators that are not based on the type
of business or service that [they] provide.” 190 Supporters of the merger
also called for expedited approval. 191 Such sentiments support FINRA’s
belief that its new configuration will provide greater protection for

26, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-77.pdf; Letter from
Michael J. Mungenast, CEO, ProEquities to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 23, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-56.pdf; Letter from Joseph P.
Borg, President, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n, Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr.
17, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-74.pdf; Letter from
William R. Pictor, President, Trubee, Collins & Co., Inc., to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-72.pdf; Letter
from M. LaRae Bakerink, CEO, WBB Securities, Inc. to Christopher Cox, Chairman,
SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-71.pdf;
Letter from Walter S. Robertson, III, President & CEO, Scott & Stringfellow Inc. to
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007023/nasd2007023-70.pdf; Letter from Dale E. Brown, CEO, Fin. Serv. Inst. To Nancy
Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007023/nasd2007023-56.pdf; Letter from Mark S. Casady, Chairman and CEO, LPL Fin.
Serv. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd2007-023/nasd2007023-63.pdf; William A. Johnstone, President and CEO, D.A.
Davidson & Co. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-62.pdf; Letter from William
C. Alsover, Chairman, Centennial Sec. Co. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16,
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-61.pdf; Letter from
Lisa Roth, President Nat’l Ass’n of Indep. Broker-Dealers to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-58.pdf; Letter
from Deborah Castiglioni, CEO, Cutter & Co. Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr.
16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-567pdf; Letter from
David W. Stringer, President, Prospera Fin. Serv. Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-55.pdf; Letter
from Ira D. Hammerman, Managing Dir., SIFMA to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr.
16, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-54.pdf; Letter from
Albert Kramer, President, Kramer Sec. Corp. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 16,
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-51.pdf; Letter from E.
John Moloney, President and CEO, Moloney Sec. Co., Inc. to Nancy Morris, Sec’y,
SEC (Apr. 15, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-45.pdf;
Letter from Sennett Kirk, Kirk Sec. Corp. to SEC (Apr. 12, 2007),
http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-27.pdf.
190. Letter from M. LaRae Bakerink, supra note 189.
191. Id.
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investors. FINRA commenced its operations under the approval of the
SEC in July 2007. 192
B. Governance Structure
One of the most talked about changes is FINRA’s new governance
structure. 193 Mary Schapiro, formerly CEO and Chairwoman of the
NASD, serves as FINRA’s CEO and Richard Ketchum, formerly head
of NYSE Regulation, Inc., serves as Chairman of FINRA’s interim
board. 194 The interim board of governors consists of twenty-three
members for a transitional period of three years and is structured as
follows:
• The CEO and Non-Executive Chairman will serve on the interim
Board of Governors.
• Eleven Governors will be appointed from outside the securities
industry.
▪ The current NASD Board and NYSE Boards each will
appoint five Public Governors.
▪ One Public Governor will be appointed jointly by both
organizations.
• Ten Governors will be from inside the securities industry.
▪ Three representatives (nominated by NASD) to be elected
by small firms (1-150 registered representatives); small
firms may also present their own slate of nominees.
▪ One representative (jointly nominated) to be elected by
medium-sized firms (151-499 registered representatives);
medium-sized firms may also present their own slate of
nominees. Three representatives (nominated by NYSE)
192. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD and
NYSE Consolidation (July 26, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007151.htm. FINRA was originally named the Securities Industry Regulatory Authority
(“SIRA”). Smith & Scannell, supra note 5. After receiving public objection concerning
the proposed name because of its similarity to an Arabic word, “commonly spelled
Sirah, which refers to the biographies of the Prophet Muhammad,” it was changed to
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Susanne Craig, Deals & Dealmakers: For
the NASD, Goodbye, SIRA – Kay-Syrah Sira – Street’s Securities Cop Renames Itself
After Flap; A Muslim Connection, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2007, at C2.
193. Comment on NASD Rulemaking, supra note 165.
194. FINRA, FINRA Board of Governors, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Corp
orateInformation/FINRALeadership/FINRABoardofGovernors/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2008).
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to be elected by large firms (500 or more registered
representatives); large firms may also present their own
slate of nominees.
▪ Three repressentatives will fill the remaining three seats,
including an NYSE-appointed floor member, an NASDappointed representative of independent dealers/insurance
affiliated broker-dealers and a jointly appointed
representative of investment companies. 195
Merging of the two SROs resulted in a “streamlined [organization] .
. . better suited to [deal with] the complexity and competitiveness of
today’s global capital markets.” 196 In recent years, many companies,
even those eligible to list their securities in the U.S., have opted to list
abroad, naming a fragmented regulatory infrastructure as a leading
reason. 197 It was, therefore, only a matter of time before a consolidation
would be necessary to promote confidence in the U.S. economic system.
FINRA is responsible for policing nearly every facet of the securities
industry, from individual registration, examination and training to rule
writing, rule enforcement and examination of firms. 198 In addition to
carrying out its own regulatory responsibilities, FINRA “also performs
market regulation under contract for The NASDAQ Stock Market, the
American Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange and
the Chicago Climate Exchange.” 199
Staffed with over 3,000
200
it is hoped that the organization is well-equipped to
employees,
handle the industry challenges that will arise in the future and prevent
future market disasters.

195.
196.
197.

NYSE Group Inc., supra note 149.
About FINRA, supra note 6 (quoting Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA).
See Liz Moyer, Too Many Regulators for Wall Street?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 9,
2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/09/sia-wall-street-boca-biz-cx_lm_1
109sia.html.
198. See About FINRA, supra note 6.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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V. BENEFITS AND EFFECTS
A. The Investing Public
Subprime-related arbitrations and lawsuits have already begun and
the number will surely increase as more investors advance investment
complaints. 201 FINRA will provide the principal forum for securities
arbitration and mediation claims involving member firms. 202 Prior to
consolidation, the NASD had “operat[ed] the largest securities dispute
resolution forum, processing over 4,600 arbitrations and nearly 1,000
mediations in 2006” 203 alone. It continually made efforts to streamline
its arbitration and mediation processes and in 2007 revised its Code of
Arbitration Procedure, making it a less onerous process for users. 204
Among its new customer-friendly features, the revised code is
organized in a logical sequence, 205 provides a comprehensive definitions
section, and uses “plain English” explanations throughout. 206 FINRA is
currently working on eliminating discrepancies and inconsistencies to
develop uniform arbitration and mediation procedures that take into
account the beneficial features of its predecessors. 207
In addition to paying close attention to issues related to subprime
mortgage-backed products, 208 FINRA will also look into suitability
issues and marketing of certain products to particular populations of

201. See Lori Pizzani, Morgan Keegan Lawsuits, Arb Claims Could be Tip of
Subprime Iceberg, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.mmexecutive.com/issues/2008_2/90216-1.html.
202. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD
to Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of
the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, File No. SR-NASD-2007-023, at 2-3 (July 26,
2007), available at http://sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf.
203. Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2.
204. See NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Apr. 16,
2007), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/p018365.pdf.
205. Proposed Rule Change by NASD, File No. SR-NASD-2003-158, at 6 (Oct. 15,
2003), http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/nasdw_0093
10.pdf.
206. Id. at 32. “In 1998, the SEC launched an initiative to encourage issuers and
self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) to use “plain English” in disclosure documents
and other materials used by investors.” Id.
207. See Levine, supra note 121.
208. See id.
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investors such as seniors. 209 Earlier this year, FINRA initiated two
regulatory sweeps aimed at ensuring that firms are utilizing suitable
sales practice methods in dealing with seniors and with those nearing
retirement. 210 Of concern are professional designations being used by
registered representatives, implying expertise in areas such as retirement
planning, when the registered representative did not undergo adequate
training or does not possess specific knowledge in these areas. 211
FINRA is committed to tackling such issues and currently has
approximately seventy open investigations relating to seniors.212
Marketing tactics are also under close scrutiny, especially the use of
“free lunch” investment seminars. 213 In more than half of the free
investment seminar investigations conducted by several regulators,
including the SEC and FINRA, they found that the “sales materials—
including the invitations and advertisements for the events—contained
claims that appeared to be exaggerated, misleading or otherwise
unwarranted [a]nd [that] 12 [%] of the seminars appeared to involve
fraud, ranging from unfounded projections of returns to sales of
fictitious products.” 214
FINRA plans to do better by constantly surveying the market. 215
FINRA will analyze investors’ experiences with the latest products, 216
identify potential regulatory issues and act expeditiously to prevent
investor harm or immediately rectify any harm that has already
occurred. 217 Recent issues surrounding the subprime mortgage crisis

209. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Announces Major Regulatory Sweeps at
Seniors Summit (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007
NewsReleases/P036809.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Press Release, FINRA, supra note 209.
213. See generally FINRA Investor Alert, “Free Lunch” Investment Seminars–
Avoiding the Heartburn of a Hard Sell, (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.finra.org/Investor
Information/InvestorAlerts/FraudsandScams/FreeLunchInvestmentSeminars-Avoiding
theHeartburnofaHardSell/index.htm (discussing the negative aspects of free investment
seminars).
214. Id.
215. Mary L. Schapiro, CEO, FINRA, Remarks at FINRA Fall Securities
Conference (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Mary
L.Schapiro/P037180 [Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference].
216. Id. To accomplish this, FINRA implemented the “Ahead of the Curve
Program.” Id.
217. Id.
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require regulators to take a proactive approach. FINRA will continue to
remain abreast of the regulatory controversies plaguing the industry and
will look closely at how they will affect investors. 218
B. The Securities Industry
The most grueling and complex challenge for FINRA will be
synchronization of the NYSE’s and NASD’s rulebooks. 219 “Member
conduct rules in particular are being held up to significant scrutiny and
detailed analysis and [FINRA is] fully committed to seeking broad input
on the approaches [it] will recommend.” 220 FINRA identified five
principles to uphold while integrating the rulebooks. 221 The first entails
meticulous review of each former SRO’s rules to determine which, if
any, is the better and more effective rule or whether a new rule should
be created. 222 Second, FINRA will also tailor each rule to the specific
firm 223 taking into account the diversity in member size, business model
or type of customer. 224 Third, FINRA will determine whether rules can
be categorized in a “conceptual manner,” in hopes of giving firms more
insight into the rationale behind the regulation. 225 The fourth and fifth
principles entail development of clearer rules and implementation of a
“principles-based approach” wherever possible. 226
Synchronization has commenced, and already has received
criticism from the public. 227 SIFMA recently raised some concerns
regarding the coordination of these rules, warning that it could instead
lead to triplication. 228 At the heart of that assertion lays the current
method of submitting rule changes. 229 The process still seems disjointed
according to SIFMA, which urges the SEC to suspend approval of the
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Harmonization Rule Could Lead to Triplication, WALL ST.
LETTER, Sept. 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 19675359 (Westlaw) (discussing the
need for a consolidated rulebook).
228. Id.
229. See id.
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rule changes 230 if FINRA “is unlikely to incorporate changes relating to
the common rules into its rulebook.” 231 Despite such commentary,
FINRA has been actively submitting new rule changes 232 in furtherance
of its harmonization efforts.
1. Principles-Based Regulation
Members of the U.S. financial industry have kept a vigilant eye on
the principles-based approach to regulation employed abroad. This
method of regulation is touted as one of high effectiveness and
efficiency and has been in use by the United Kingdom since 2001. 233
This form of oversight focuses on outcomes by setting standards as to
the types of actions and behaviors expected from firms, rather than
focusing on the particular rules. 234 As explained by SIFMA,
[R]egulation by principles and by rules is best described as a
continuum of regulatory options. At one end of the continuum a
regulator articulates principles and leaves a firm to determine wholly
how to achieve the outcome called for in the principle; at the other
end of the continuum the regulator dictates through a prescriptive
rule how the outcome must be achieved. Within the continuum are
various types of guidance that a regulator could promulgate to assist
235
a firm in achieving outcomes.

Some critics of principles-based oversight argue that such
regulation only works in wholesale markets and that retail markets
require rules-based oversight. 236 FINRA has provided that it will use a
combination of the two to ensure that the most efficient method of
regulation is employed. 237 The diversification within the securities

230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Proposed Rule Change by FINRA, File No. SR-2007-008 (Aug. 30,
2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/
p036662.pdf.
233. See generally The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law: “The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?”, 12 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259 (2007).
234. See id. at 270.
235. Lackritz, Testimony, supra note 31.
236. See The Rules of the Game, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 18026488 (Westlaw).
237. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
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realm requires FINRA to utilize the most advantageous processes,
including those that are principles-based, wherever possible. 238
2. Single Exam Program
Developing a single examination program poses another
multifaceted challenge for FINRA.239 Broker-dealers belonging to
multiple SROs are subject to periodic audits by these organizations to
identify any regulatory deficiencies. 240 As a single entity, FINRA will
provide its members with one examination program. 241 It will require
bringing together two diverse examination teams, training them on the
new technological platforms, and hopefully creating a synergetic and
symbiotic relationship between them. 242 The organization hopes to fully
integrate its examination program by 2008, but recognizes the obstacles
that such an endeavor may present. 243 Among them, the highest hurdle
may be identifying, extracting and retaining the strengths of each
program while establishing one unified approach.
FINRA will employ a more risk-based methodology in its
investigations, 244 advancing its commitment of considering each firm’s
unique needs while developing its examination program. This will
require looking at both the financial company’s areas of deficiency as
well as the issues plaguing the existent regulatory landscape. FINRA’s
surveillance of certain firms will also be heightened. 245 FINRA will
work with each firm to address regulatory concerns regarding their
product offerings and any related market issues. 246

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2.
See Maloney Act, supra note 120.
Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 219.
See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 2.
See Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215.
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO, NASD, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce First Annual Capital Markets Summit: Securing America’s
Competitiveness (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony
/MaryL.Schapiro/P018816.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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3. “Firm Gateway” System
FINRA is also introducing several new tools and programs for the
industry. One of FINRA’s newest technological innovations is the Firm
Gateway System, providing member firms easy access to regulatory
forms, filings, notices of upcoming rule changes, and other useful
resources. 247 This portal will allow firms to submit their FINRA
electronic forms online, expediting the submission process. 248 The
system will also reduce the need for multiple passwords to log into
different programs by providing easy access to other applications.249
After complete implementation, the system “will be available to about
25,000 firm users—mostly compliance personnel at FINRA-regulated
broker-dealers.” 250
4. Small Firm Emergency Partner Program
FINRA is also taking steps to assist small firms with business
continuity planning. 251 Recent tragic events such as hurricane Katrina as
well as business interruptions like mass black-outs have been
detrimental to businesses, requiring that organizations be equipped to
continue operations in case of such disasters. 252 Large companies have
the resources for such back-up capabilities, but many small firms do not.
To deal with such issues, FINRA has developed the “Small Firm
Emergency Partner Program.” 253 This voluntary program will match a
firm with another “pre-established partner firm unaffected by the event
to step in temporarily and assist [the firm’s] customers regarding
liquidating transactions.” 254 At the contracting firm’s discretion, “they
can expand their agreement to include limited categories of purchases,
such as money market funds.” 255
This new program further
247. See FINRA Firm Gateway System, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/reg_syste
ms/documents/regulatory_systems/p036867.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
248. Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., FINRA, Small Firm Emergency Partner Program: Overview and
Guide, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rules_regs/p037162.pdf
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
252. Id.
253. See Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215.
254. FINRA, Small Firm Emergency Partner Program, supra note 251.
255. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Financial companies, especially those having experienced some
type of merger or acquisition, are fully aware of the complexities and
intricacies involved in such transactions. 256 The process can be very
gradual and, as some organizations can attest, never truly
accomplished. 257 The FINRA merger “required bringing together two
workforces, two complete sets of technologies, two cultures and two
funding mechanisms.” 258 FINRA has been forthcoming in informing the
public that the process is complex and that it is working to have full
harmonization as quickly as possible. 259
Synchronization of the rules is perhaps the greatest challenge faced
by this new organization and it is safe to say that failure of this initiative
will render the merger a disappointment in the eyes of many. Therefore,
it is imperative that FINRA is given support to allow them to get it right.
As the first considerable change in the regulatory system in decades, it is
expected that many will voice their opposition and criticism. Many are
resistant to change, and some comments will simply be tenuous. Others,
however, will be warranted, especially worries concerning the
expediency of rule harmonization and choosing those most suitable to
ensure efficient regulation. Certainly, it would not be in the best interest
of the industry or the public to employ lax or subpar regulations.
Adequate oversight of the financial industry is necessary to build
investor confidence. As we continue to feel the effects of the subprime
mortgage crisis and worries of a recession pervade the industry, 260 it is
crucial that the public maintain some level of confidence in the financial
markets. FINRA is dedicated to investor protection, and the merger

256.

See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.9 MERGER AGREEMENT (Aspen
Law & Business 2002) (1998) (stating the Delaware law regarding merger agreements).
257. See Why Do So Many Mergers Fail?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Mar. 30, 2005,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlepdf/1137.pdf?CFID=50312265&CFTOKEN
=26349611&jsessionid=a83051919f32372c2458.
258. Schapiro, Remarks at FINRA Conference, supra note 215.
259. Schapiro, Remarks at SIFMA, supra note 32.
260. See Recession Fears Hit Stocks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120518660320825319.html.
OF
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came at just the right time. The move to consolidate fostered an
obligation to the public and to the industry, helping to restore and
promote a robust U.S. market economy and to preserve market integrity
at a time when both U.S. market wealth and integrity have been shaken.

